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INTRODUCTION
Climate change is a global issue that has been gaining
awareness on the local, national, and international levels for
decades, but thus far the United States has taken very little
meaningful governmental action to address the current effects
of climate change or to attempt to reduce future impacts.  Al-
though there have been some efforts—ranging from purely
symbolic to potentially impactful—at all levels of governance to
address the causes and effects of climate change, through re-
sponse, mitigation or adaptation, so far these have all fallen
short of what many scientists believe is necessary to avoid the
most severe or irreversible consequences.  Because climate
change is, by its nature, a broad issue that affects the entire
planet, it might seem logical to assume that it primarily re-
quires an international solution.1  However, the current politi-
cal climate, both among the international community and
within the United States, has made an effective and timely
international or national solution almost impossible.  Even the
significant 2015 Paris Agreement, widely considered an inter-
national climate-change law success story, largely lacks bind-
ing language and enforcement mechanisms and contains a
simple withdrawal clause, leaving the door open for the next
U.S. president to withdraw easily.2  Considering the existing
barriers to larger-scale action and absent a major event caus-
ing a sudden and dramatic shift in political will,3 the most
1 See David Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796,
1798, 1846 (2008) (“[R]egulatory authority should reside at the level of govern-
ment that roughly ‘matches’ the geographic scope of the subject environmental
problem.  Hence . . . climate change should be addressed at the international
level.”  “[C]limate change is widely regarded as the textbook example of a global
commons problem that is best addressed at the national and international
levels.”).
2 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, art. 28, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/
REV.1 (Dec. 12, 2015).
3 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1841 (“Numerous scholars have
acknowledged the importance of . . . dramatic events [such as Love Canal; the
Bhopal, India tragedy; and the Exxon Valdez oil spill] in prompting congressional
action on [federal environmental] statutes . . . .”).
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effective approach to addressing climate change within the
United States is at the state level, through agency regulatory
action.
With global average temperatures rising,4 there has been a
correlated increase in the frequency of certain natural disas-
ters, including wildfires, droughts, floods, hurricanes, and
others.5  While no single event can be said to have been caused
solely by climate change, numerous scientists have shown that
climate change influences various factors that lead to an in-
creased rate of such events occurring.6  Additionally, sea level
rise and ocean acidification is directly related to climate
change, and many coastal areas in the United States have be-
gun to experience the effects of the rising oceans.7  Human,
animal and plant life have already been adversely affected by
climate change, and these effects will only increase in intensity
over time unless serious steps are taken to mitigate the effects
of and adapt to climate change.8  The effects of climate change
have already begun to significantly shape national and interna-
tional politics, result in negative economic impacts, influence
international relations, and affect national security and immi-
gration concerns.9
Considering the need for governmental action to prevent
climate change from becoming more severe and to respond to
its current effects, the issue of how advocates of U.S. action on
climate change should focus their efforts on inspiring govern-
ment action is a critically important one.  Although a coordi-
nated and concerted effort at all levels of government would
clearly be the ideal approach to addressing climate change,10
the current political reality in the United States minimizes the
4 JERRY M. MELILLO ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 8 (2014) (“U.S. average temperature has in-
creased by 1.3° F to 1.9° F since 1895, and most of this increase has occurred
since 1970.”); see also Justin Gillis, 2015 Likely to Be Hottest Year Ever Recorded,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/science/
2015-likely-to-be-hottest-year-ever-recorded.html [https://perma.cc/8GRB-
KNAT] (documenting the temperature increases of 2015 and predicting that it will
be the hottest year yet recorded); Tom Randall & Blacki Migliozzi, 2014 Was the
Hottest Year on Record, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/
graphics/2014-hottest-year-on-record/ [https://perma.cc/R78E-GR59] (demon-
strating that 2014 was the hottest year yet recorded).
5 MELILLO ET AL., supra note 4, at 8–11.
6 See id. at 8–11.
7 See id. at 9–10.
8 See id. at 12–13.
9 See id. at 13, 591, 621, 826.
10 See HARI M. OSOFSKY & LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND
POLICY 266 (2012) (“The advantage of a polycentric approach is that it encourages
experimentation by multiple actors, as well as the development of methods for
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possibility of a sufficiently significant commitment to curb
emissions occurring within the requisite timeframe.11  Scien-
tists have found that in order to prevent the most catastrophic
effects of climate change from becoming nearly inevitable,
global average temperatures can increase no more than 2° C
beyond 1990 temperatures.12  Achieving this would necessitate
stabilizing atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations some-
where between 350–400 parts per million and would require an
approximately 80% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions be-
low current levels by 2050 for most industrialized countries.13
Despite the abundant availability of scientific research ex-
pounding the measures that are necessary to prevent or miti-
gate the effects of climate change, politicians and
policymakers—particularly in the United States—have largely
failed to act.  Unfortunately, it is probable that a major instigat-
ing event or crisis will be necessary to spur significant political
action.14  However, in the absence of a shift in political will, one
somewhat counterintuitive approach to governmental action
could prove the most effective means of addressing climate
change in the United States.
This Note argues that the most effective approach to ad-
dressing climate change in the current political environment is
to focus on state-level regulatory action.  Part I of this Note
provides the context and brief overview of governmental efforts
to address climate change at the state, regional, and federal
levels, and in the international context.  In Part II, this Note
presents arguments against placing the primary focus of gov-
ernmental efforts at the regional, federal, or international levels
and against focusing more on state legislation than on state
regulation.  Part III advocates for pursuing governmental action
on climate change at the state level, particularly through regu-
lation.  The Note concludes by highlighting that this argument
is made within the context of the current political environment,
and emphasizes the importance of U.S. governmental action on
climate change at all levels simultaneously whenever possible.
assessing the benefits and costs of particular strategies adopted in one setting
and comparing these with results obtained in other settings.”).
11 See id. (“‘[O]ptimal’ solutions for making substantial reductions in the level
of [greenhouse gases] emitted into the atmosphere are only a dream.”); see also
2015 Anti-Environmental Budget Riders, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNSEL,
http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/2015-riders.asp [https://perma.cc/K9Y5-
CPMH] (last updated Nov. 18, 2015) (listing anti-environmental riders added to
spending bills for fiscal year 2016).
12 See CHRIS WOLD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 45–46 (2009).
13 See id.
14 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1841.
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I
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. State-Level Legislation and Regulation
of Climate Change
To date, at least thirty-five states have adopted some
method of reducing or capping greenhouse gas emissions
within their borders.15  As of 2008, twenty-six states and the
District of Columbia had established renewable portfolio stan-
dards for energy suppliers that require a certain percentage of
their portfolio to come from renewable power sources.16  For
most of these programs, the percentage required to come from
renewable sources increases gradually over time so that energy
suppliers have sufficient time to adjust.17
The clear leader among the states in terms of action to
address climate change is California.  The second highest emit-
ter after Texas, California ranks among the “top 20 emitters in
the world, including all countries” but, more so than Texas,
California has taken significant steps to mitigate its contribu-
tion to climate change.18  In 2006, California passed a
landmark climate change law, the California Global Warming
Solutions Act, which acknowledged that global warming posed
a serious threat to the state and  set goals for emission reduc-
tions.19  California also committed to significant water-use re-
ductions in 2009, aiming for a 20% reduction in per capita
water use by 2020.20
California’s state version of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA) is particularly interesting because its application to
climate change has the potential to “force substantive changes
in agency practices.”21  This may be the case because CEQA
“prohibits an agency from approving a project that will have
significant environmental impacts if feasible alternatives or
15 See Vivian E. Thomson & Vicki Arroyo, Upside-Down Cooperative Federal-
ism: Climate Change Policymaking and the States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3 (2011).
16 WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 841.
17 See id.
18 OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 267.
19 See id. at 267–69; WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 845–49.
20 Patricia Romero-Lankao et al., North America, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY; PART B: REGIONAL ASPECTS CONTRIBUTION OF
WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1450 (V.R. Barros et al. eds., 2014).
21 WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 857–58.
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feasible mitigation measures could avoid or substantially
lessen those impacts.”22
One of California’s most influential and contentious efforts
at addressing greenhouse gas emissions has been spearheaded
by the California Air Resources Board (CARB), established in
1967, which “sets air quality standards and regulates vehicular
emissions.”23  California ran into trouble when the state en-
acted a law requiring CARB to establish greenhouse gas emis-
sion standards for vehicles and CARB complied by setting
standards that would go into effect in 2009.24  Automakers
sued CARB, claiming it was preempting federal authority to set
fuel efficiency standards, and the “Environmental Protection
Agency [(EPA)] refused to grant California a Clean Air Act
waiver, which is needed to adopt state auto emission standards
that are stricter than federal limits.”25  It was not until 2009
that the EPA, under President Barack Obama, not only granted
California its request for a Clean Air Act waiver but also built
upon California’s program to develop new federal emission
standards.26
New York closely follows California as a leader among U.S.
states in developing climate change policy and regulation.  New
York has more stringent laws and regulations regarding envi-
ronmental impacts of state actions than most other states due
to its State Environmental Quality Review (SEQR) require-
ments.27  Similar to California’s CEQA, New York’s SEQR law
resembles NEPA, and it requires that all government actors
conduct an environmental impact assessment before going for-
ward with almost all state activities, projects, or permits.28
22 Id. at 858.
23 Thomson & Arroyo, supra note 15, at 13.
24 See id. at 13–14.
25 Id. at 14.
26 See id. (“The EPA projects that nationwide greenhouse gas emissions from
the ‘light-duty fleet’ (cars and light trucks) will be twenty-one percent lower in
2030 as a result of these harmonized rules, and that owners of model-year 2016
cars will save $4000 in fuel costs over the life of their vehicles, which will more
than offset the vehicles’ modest increased cost ($1000).”).
27 See Michael Lewyn, How Environmental Review Can Generate Car-Induced
Pollution: A Case Study, 14 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 16, 16 (2014); SEQR:
Environmental Impact Assessment in New York State, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/permits/357.html
[https://perma.cc/8LHV-444A] [hereinafter NYS DOEC, SEQR]; see also WOLD ET
AL., supra note 12, at 857 (noting that state governments, including New York’s,
have begun implementing “little NEPA” laws).
28 See NYS DOEC, SEQR, supra note 27.
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In 2002, New York announced an Energy Plan that set
ambitious and aggressive emission reduction goals.29  The En-
ergy Plan aims to “reduce the state’s energy intensity (con-
sumption per unit of GDP), make the state more energy self-
sufficient, diversify its energy sources, rely more on the state’s
natural energy supplies, and reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions . . . five percent below 1990 levels by 2010 and ten per-
cent below 1990 levels by 2020.”30
Recently, New York took significant steps toward address-
ing climate change when it enacted the Community Risk and
Resiliency Act in 2014.31  This act grants certain state agencies
significant regulatory authority over climate change adaptation
and mitigation measures and requires that all state funds and
permits take climate change risks, mitigation, and adaptation
into account.32  New York is the only state in the country with
requirements that state funds and permitting processes must
all take climate change into account.33  The enactment of the
Community Risk and Resiliency Act was particularly notable
because it passed with broad bipartisan support in the wake of
recent disasters such as Hurricane Irene in 2011 and Hurri-
cane Sandy in 2012.34
In Maryland, what started as a plan for coastal resources
expanded and developed to include “human health, agricul-
ture, ecosystems, water resources, and infrastructure.”35  The
State of Washington has developed a climate change adapta-
tion plan with numerous focus areas, including: the natural
environment, ecosystems, species, habitat, natural resources,
29 See Thomson & Arroyo, supra note 15, at 20.
30 Id.
31 New York State Community Risk and Resiliency Act, HR A6558B 2013
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014) (enacted),  http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_
fld=&bn=A06558&term=2013&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Memo=&Text=Y [https:/
/perma.cc/CT5B-G57D]; see also Katherine Bagley, Climate Change Law in New
York Bridges Partisan Divide, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Aug. 5, 2014), http://insidecli
matenews.org/news/20140805/climate-change-law-new-york-bridges-partisan-
divide [https://perma.cc/2HGM-9HRL] (examining the events that precipitated
the law and its bipartisan nature); Jessica Piccinini, Gov. Signs Risk and Resili-
ency Act to Help Government Deal with Climate Change, Stronger Storms, THE
LEGISLATIVE GAZETTE (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.legislativegazette.com/Articles-
Top-Stories-c-2014-09-23-89297.113122-Gov-signs-Risk-and-Resiliency-Act-to-
help-government-deal-with-climate-change-stronger-storms.html [https://
perma.cc/F8U2-R8KW] (outlining the aims and impacts of the law).
32 See New York State Community Risk and Resiliency Act, supra note 31;
Piccinini, supra note 31.
33 See Bagley, supra note 31.
34 See id.
35 Romero-Lankao et al., supra note 20, at 1475.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-6\CRN605.txt unknown Seq: 8 19-SEP-16 16:15
1634 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1627
infrastructure, communities, human health, and security.36
Washington, Oregon, and Massachusetts have all implemented
regulatory programs that either limit emissions from coal-fired
power plants or require that the power plants offset a portion of
their emissions.37  In addition, Massachusetts adopted the
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Policy in 2007 that mandates the
quantification of greenhouse gas emissions for many state
projects and the development of alternatives to the projects
that include measures to “avoid, minimize, or mitigate”
emissions.38
Numerous other states have taken moderate to significant
actions toward addressing climate change through mitigation
or adaptation,39 although there are a number of states that
have not yet taken any legislative or regulatory steps regarding
climate change.40  However, as a result of the recent Clean
Power Plan promulgated under the Environmental Protection
Agency’s Clean Air Act authority, almost every state will now be
required to implement emissions reduction plans.41  The Clean
Power Plan may result in an increase in non-federally man-
dated state action on climate change as each state evaluates
where it can best curb emissions to comply with the plan.
However, the Clean Power Plan is currently being challenged in
the courts by a coalition of states, corporations, and industry
groups, and the case is likely to eventually reach the Supreme
Court.42  Overall, however, the trend among states taking inde-
pendent action appears to be in the direction of states such as
California, New York, and Massachusetts.
B. Regional Approaches to Climate Change Mitigation
and Adaptation
There are multiple—occasionally overlapping—regional in-
itiatives in North America that attempt to address climate
36 Id.
37 See WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 852.
38 Id. at 857.
39 See Thomson & Arroyo, supra note 15, at 21 (referring to Maryland, Texas,
and Florida as “ ‘surprise states’ . . . because the policies affecting greenhouse gas
emissions in these states are more aggressive than would be expected”).
40 See id. at 26 (“State policymakers in Virginia, Louisiana, and South Caro-
lina have done little to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, directly or indirectly.”).
41 Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,663–64 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
42 See Coral Davenport, Court Rejects a Bid to Block Coal Plant Regulations,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/22/us/politics/
court-rejects-bid-to-delay-obama-rule-on-climate-change.html [https://perma.
cc/6AMR-JGKD].
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change in various ways, predominantly through the regulation
of greenhouse gases.43  North America 2050 is a multi-regional
collaborative focused on mitigating the effects of climate
change and working toward low-carbon economies.44  The Pa-
cific Coast Collaborative, which includes U.S. states along the
west coast and British Columbia, concentrates on investments
in clean energy and promoting low-carbon development initia-
tives.45  The Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord was
launched in 2007 by six Midwestern states and the governor of
Manitoba, Canada, and the members agreed to establish emis-
sion targets and to develop a regional cap-and-trade pro-
gram.46  The Transportation and Climate Initiative includes
eleven northeastern and mid-Atlantic state members along
with the District of Columbia.47  This organization was founded
to facilitate collaboration between these jurisdictions and to
“develop a clean energy economy and reduce greenhouse gas
emissions in the transportation sector.”48
Only two regional initiatives in the United States imple-
ment greenhouse gas emissions cap-and-trade programs.
There is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a
group of nine northeastern states, led primarily by New York,
engaged in the first mandatory cap-and-trade program for car-
bon dioxide emissions in the United States.49  This program
allows member states to sell emission allowances through auc-
tions and the proceeds are used by the states to invest in re-
newable energy and green infrastructure projects.50  The initial
goal for the RGGI was “to meet 2005 emission levels by 2009
and then reduce[ ] emissions by 10 percent below 2009 levels
by the end of 2018.”51  The other initiative using a cap-and-
trade program, the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), focuses on
emissions trading programs, and its membership includes Cal-
ifornia, British Columbia, and Quebec.52  California was criti-








49 See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org [http://
perma.cc/6KLH-WDS4] (“[RGGI] is the first market-based regulatory program in
the United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”); Multi-State Climate Ini-
tiatives, supra note 43.
50 See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 49.
51 WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 830.
52 See Multi-State Climate Initiatives, supra note 43.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-6\CRN605.txt unknown Seq: 10 19-SEP-16 16:15
1636 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1627
cal to the establishment of WCI, which has an overall goal to
achieve a reduction in emissions within the region of 15%  be-
low 2005 levels by 2020.53
C. Federal Legislation and Regulation of Climate Change
Although the federal government took significant action
regarding environmental issues decades ago when it enacted
legislation such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the
Endangered Species Act, and the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act, there has been limited legislative action and no signifi-
cant revisions or updates made to the laws since their
enactment to reflect improved knowledge regarding climate
change’s causes and effects.  Additionally, there has been no
federal legislation specifically addressing or focusing on climate
change.
In 2002, President Bush announced a climate change pol-
icy that focused on greenhouse gas intensity targets and volun-
tary reporting of emission reductions for businesses.54  In
2009, under the leadership of President Obama, the federal
government began implementing a plan to have all federal
agencies assess climate change adaptation in all of their deci-
sion-making processes and to initiate adaptation strategies.55
Since the implementation of this plan, “the [U.S.] Department
of Interior created Climate Science Centers” and the EPA’s “Of-
fice of Water developed a climate change strategy.”56  In June
2014, President Obama and the Environmental Protection
Agency announced the Clean Power Plan, which includes the
first national carbon pollution standards for existing power
plants and aims for a “32 percent reduction in carbon pollution
[from the power sector] by 2030.”57  The Clean Power Plan,
regulation promulgated under existing Clean Air Act authority,
is the most significant direct effort to address climate change to
date in the United States.58  However, despite the significant
strides made by this plan, it still faces legal and political chal-
53 OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 269.
54 WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 479–82.
55 Romero-Lankao et al., supra note 20, at 1475.
56 Id.
57 Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change [http://perma.cc/C8SQ-T4LC].
58 Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,663–64 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see Amanda Stone & Mae Bowen, What the Clean
Power Plan Means for America, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 3, 2015, 9:35 AM), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/08/03/what-clean-power-plan-means-america
[https://perma.cc/6LZJ-6JGR].
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lenges and is vulnerable to the possibility that a less climate-
focused president could take office and reverse course.59
Although this Note refers only to a limited number of the
actions taken at the federal level, including somewhat signifi-
cant recent efforts, overall there has been very little federal
action in support of addressing climate change.  Additionally,
Congress has actually made a significant number of efforts to
prevent certain actions to address climate change.60  For exam-
ple, Congress has attempted, and occasionally succeeded, in
passing bills that either preempt existing state regulations ad-
dressing climate change or that prohibit state measures above
a certain standard in order to protect business interests
against stringent state regulation.61
D. International Responses to Climate Change
In 1992, the United States became a party to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
a nonbinding treaty agreement expressing the importance of
stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at
a level that would not be seriously harmful to the planet.62
Since the UNFCC, there have been no major binding inter-
national treaties on climate change,63 although the interna-
tional community recently committed to significant emissions
59 See Davenport, supra note 42; Lauren Leatherby, Where Presidential Can-
didates Stand on Climate Change, NPR (Aug. 11, 2015, 7:03 AM), http://www.
npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/08/11/429781692/where-presidential-
candidates-stand-on-climate-change [https://perma.cc/6MUM-6EQK].
60 Chris Mooney, Amid Record Global Temperatures, Senate Votes to Block




61 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1796–97, 1801 n.16 (2008) (dis-
cussing Congress’ attempts to preempt state actions intended to limit greenhouse
gas emissions and noting that businesses advocate for “ceilings” on regulation to
limit states’ power); PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 14–15 (2004) (“[M]ore
federal preemptions have occurred in recent decades than over the rest of U.S.
history”); see, e.g., H.R. 2927, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007) (preempting state laws
and regulations on tire fuel efficiency that deviate from requirements set by the
Department of Transportation); Alternative Fuel Standard Act of 2007, S. 1158,
110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (preempting state laws and regulations regarding renewa-
ble energy content in fuels when the EPA issues a waiver).
62 See Thomson & Arroyo, supra note 15, at 4; see generally United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107,
available at http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publica
tions_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf [http://perma.cc/S46H-7229].
63 See ROSEMARY RAYFUSE & SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ERA OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2012).
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reductions in the Paris Agreement.64 The Kyoto Protocol,65
which was intended to build off of the foundation laid by the
UNFCCC, “failed to attract the participation and/or compliance
of major developed economy emitters during its first commit-
ment period (2008 to 2012) and did not . . . impose emissions
reduction obligations on developing states.”66  In 2009, the
United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen en-
ded in failure with only a symbolic political document, the Co-
penhagen Accord, to show as a result.67  Expectations were
lowered for the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustaina-
ble Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (known as Rio+20, to
mark the twentieth anniversary of the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development) and many
heads of state, including President Obama, did not attend.68
However, President Obama has taken certain important steps
in the international arena to curb climate change, most notably
the agreement in November 2014 with China’s president, Xi
Jinping, to limit carbon dioxide emissions within the United
States and China “around 2030,” and the Paris Agreement.69
The Paris Agreement, although largely non-binding in order to
circumvent the U.S. requirement of having treaties approved by
the Senate, is the most significant international action ad-
dressing climate change and was notable for its success at
obtaining commitment from both developed and still-develop-
ing countries.70  This agreement requires countries to report on
64 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 2.
65 See Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Kyoto Protocol, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) (opened for signature Mar. 16, en-
tered into force Feb. 16, 2005).
66 See RAYFUSE & SCOTT, supra note 63, at 4 (2012).
67 See id.; see also Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the
Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to
19 December 2009, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010); Why Did Copen-
hagen Fail to Deliver a Climate Deal?, BBC News (Dec. 22, 2009, 4:33 PM), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8426835.stm [http://perma.cc/83SH-UU6G].
68 See About the Rio+20 Conference, RIO+20 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, http://www.uncsd2012.org/about.html [http://
perma.cc/S46H-7229]; see also Bryan Walsh, What the Failure of Rio+20 Means
for the Climate, TIME (June 26, 2012), http://content.time.com/time/health/arti
cle/0,8599,2118058,00.html [https://perma.cc/25N3-6XUC].
69 Edward Wong, China’s Climate Change Plan Raises Questions, N.Y. TIMES




70 Press Release, The White House, U.S. Leadership and the Historic Paris
Agreement to Combat Climate Change, (Dec. 12, 2015), https://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/12/us-leadership-and-historic-paris-agree
ment-combat-climate-change [https://perma.cc/6TFN-LMHH].
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their progress in reducing emissions and addressing climate
change every five years, and to commit to further emissions
reductions after each five-year period.71 Although historic and
a remarkable achievement in international diplomacy, under
the current commitments made by the countries party to the
Paris Agreement, global emissions levels still will not be re-
duced rapidly enough to avoid the predicted tipping point.72
As evidenced by the largely non-binding nature of the Paris
Agreement, without support in the Senate, the U.S. president—
Obama or whoever comes next—is not able to make commit-
ments on a large enough scale to tackle all of the causes and
effects of climate change at the international level.  Addition-
ally, U.S. commitment to addressing climate change through
international efforts is largely dependent on the party politics of
the president, and many of the current commitments could be
withdrawn from easily, including the Paris Agreement, if a
president who does not believe in or support action on climate
change assumes office.
II
BIGGER IS NOT ALWAYS BETTER: WHY LARGER-SCALE ATTEMPTS AT
ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE ARE LESS EFFECTIVE
A. The Inefficiencies and Uncertainties of International
Action
Political gridlock at the national level is one of the major
reasons that the United States has not yet made significant
international commitments regarding climate change and
curbing greenhouse gas emissions.  The attempts at reaching
agreement in international climate change talks in recent years
have all resulted in failure,73 in large part due to the fact that
developing countries are unwilling to commit to reducing their
impact on climate change when the United States and other
industrialized countries refuse to commit to more substantial
reductions.74 Developing countries claim that industrialized
countries have already gotten their “head start” and should
71 Id.
72 Fiona Harvey, Paris Climate Change Agreement: The World’s Greatest Diplo-
matic Success, GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2015, 2:51 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-diplomacy-developing-
united-nations [https://perma.cc/674A-78PU].
73 See RAYFUSE & SCOTT, supra note 63, at 4; see also Walsh, supra note 68.
74 See Why Did Copenhagen Fail, supra note 67; John Vidal et al., Low
Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2009,
7:47 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/18/copenha
gen-deal [http://perma.cc/GDX3-UBTZ].
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commit to greater cutbacks to reflect the greater period of time
spent emitting a higher percentage of pollutants.75  Until the
United States agrees to much more significant reductions in
emissions or some other arrangement that reflects the greater
impact that the U.S.’s development and current economy has
on the climate, any meaningful international agreement is ex-
tremely unlikely.  While the recent Paris Agreement has largely
overcome this particular political obstacle by allowing coun-
tries to participate independently using five-year cycles and
increasing emissions reductions targets, this agreement re-
mains somewhat precarious because of its largely non-binding
nature, the lack of enforcement mechanisms, and the ease with
which countries can withdraw.
One of the only earlier international climate change agree-
ments to which the U.S. committed, the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, was only committed to
because it contained no legally-binding provisions and instead
simply discussed voluntary measures that states could take to
address climate change and limit greenhouse gas emissions.76
This agreement was followed by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which
the United States signed but never even submitted to the Sen-
ate for possible ratification.77  All efforts at international agree-
ment on binding provisions limiting emissions and addressing
climate change have failed to achieve significant commitments,
particularly from the United States.78
Even significant developments such as the recent climate
agreement between the U.S. and China are vague, open-ended,
and leave parties with significant room to maneuver.79  Moreo-
ver, many scientists and policymakers view the agreement be-
tween the United States and China as achieving only the bare
minimum, and argue that both countries, but especially China,
should be committing to even more significant reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions.80  While the agreement between the
U.S. and China may have helped pave the way for the Paris
Agreement, which successfully balanced the interests of devel-
oped and developing countries, this agreement remains largely
75 See Vidal et al., supra note 74.
76 See Thomson & Arroyo, supra note 15, at 4; see generally United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 62.
77 See Thomson & Arroyo, supra note 15, at 5.
78 See Vidal et al., supra note 74; Walsh, supra note 68; Why Did Copenhagen
Fail, supra note 67.
79 See Wong, supra note 69.
80 See id.
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non-binding and has yet to be tested by time, changes in U.S.
administrations, or shifts in global politics.
B. The Improbability of Significant Federal Legislative or
Regulatory Action
Despite the fact that the vast majority of the scientific and
academic communities recognize the reality of climate change
and advocate taking action to mitigate its effects and adapt to
its consequences, the political will to take national-level action
regarding climate change is lacking.  Among the general public,
about 67% of Americans believe that global warming is occur-
ring and about 44% of Americans believe that it is caused pri-
marily by human activity.81
However, there are distinct partisan divides hidden within
these general percentages.  Among Democrats or Democrat-
leaning Americans, 84% believe that there is “solid evidence the
earth is warming” and 64% attribute this to human activity.82
Within the Republican Party and Republican-leaning Ameri-
cans, 46% believe climate change is occurring and only 23%
think that this is due to human activity.83  While the contrast-
ing perspectives illustrated by these percentages show that
there is a certain ideological divide regarding climate change in
the United States, this gap between Democrats and Republi-
cans expands dramatically and disproportionately within Con-
gress.  Although necessarily imprecise (some Republican
Congress-people have not publicly clarified their views on cli-
mate change), one recent estimate found that the proportion of
Republican representatives willing to acknowledge that climate
change is real is shockingly low at approximately 3%.84
The divide in beliefs regarding the validity of climate
change between the political parties at the national level is
disproportionately wide and has resulted in political gridlock
on the issue.  Moreover, this current unyielding tension is un-
likely to relent in the near future.  With the Republicans con-
trolling the House and the Senate at least through the end of





84 Julie Kliegman, Jerry Brown Says ‘Virtually No Republican’ in Washington
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2016, there will almost certainly be no meaningful legislation
in the near future regarding climate change absent a signifi-
cant change in political will.
Additionally, previous efforts at federal action on climate
change have resulted in very little positive progress.  In fact,
Congress has a history of being actively obstructionist and re-
gressive on climate change.  In the 1990s, during the buildup
to the Kyoto Protocol, the House of Representatives actively
prevented spending on any measure that “could be interpreted
as paving the way for implementing the Kyoto Protocol.”85  The
Senate, in anticipation of the negotiations surrounding the Pro-
tocol, passed a resolution stating opposition to any climate
change treaty that did not impose obligations on developing
nations or that might negatively impact U.S. economic
interests.86
The efforts at the federal level to stall or prevent action on
climate change have not been limited to Congress.  During
President George W. Bush’s terms in office, he attempted to
revoke the United States’ signature on the Kyoto Protocol even
though it was non-binding on the U.S. because it had never
been ratified.87  Although the Bush administration took nomi-
nal action on climate change by implementing a policy on
greenhouse gas emissions focused on emission intensity, this
policy limited certain greenhouse gas emissions while simulta-
neously allowing for an increase in overall emissions.88  In fact,
members of the Bush administration questioned the science
behind climate change and “engaged in a systematic effort to
manipulate climate change science and mislead policymakers
and the public about the dangers of global warming.”89  The
administration achieved this largely by “censor[ing] congres-
sional testimony on the causes and impacts of global warming,
control[ling] media access to government climate scientists,
85 See Thomson & Arroyo, supra note 15, at 5.
86 See id.
87 See id. at 5-6.
88 See id. at 6; WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 479-82.
89 David Biello, Editing Scientists: Science and Policy at the White House,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
white-house-editing-scientists/ [http://perma.cc/W8V3-JSW7] (quoting a report
by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform); see Thomson &
Arroyo, supra note 15, at 6; see also Andrew Revkin, Bush Aide Softened Green-
house Gas Links to Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/06/08/politics/08climate.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/9QUF-Z5LM].
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and edit[ing] federal scientific reports to inject unwarranted
uncertainty into discussions of climate change.”90
While the recently promulgated Clean Power Plan is a criti-
cal and historic step toward reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions, it faces constant opposition from the Republican
majority in the legislature and would almost certainly be over-
turned under a Republican administration.  The plan contin-
ues to face challenges in court and some state governors have
threatened to refuse to comply, so whether the plan will indeed
have its intended effect remains to be seen.91
Considering the prevailing attitudes among the congres-
sional majority regarding climate change, the limitations on
executive action without congressional support, and the possi-
bility of a climate change denier becoming president, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that there will be any significant federal
action, particularly legislation, on climate change in the near
future.
C. The Shortcomings of Regional Agreements
Although regional agreements provide forums for collabo-
ration and have potential to address uniquely regional issues,
particularly interstate water issues, they lack the kind of politi-
cal accountability or binding authority that would lead to
greater progress toward addressing climate change.  Unfortu-
nately, there are multiple examples of regional agreements in-
volving U.S. states collapsing, ceasing to be followed when
deadlines for meeting the agreed-upon emissions reductions
approach, or experiencing a significant drop in membership
after only a few years.
For example, the members of the Midwest Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Accord released a cap-and-trade rule in 2010, but
since that time the members have ceased “pursuing their
greenhouse gas goals through the Accord.”92  The Western Cli-
mate Initiative (WCI) started off strong in 2007 with California,
Arizona, New Mexico, Oregon and Washington as founding
members, and during the following four years numerous Cana-
90 Biello, supra note 89; see Thomson & Arroyo, supra note 15, at 6; see also
Revkin, supra note 89.
91 See Davenport, supra note 42; Leatherby, supra note 59; Alan Neuhauser,
6 Governors Threaten to Defy Obama’s Clean Power Plan, U.S. NEWS (July 10,
2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/10/6-gover
nors-threaten-to-defy-epa-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/8GKL-R4SH].
92 See Multi-State Climate Initiatives, supra note 43.
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dian provinces along with a few other U.S. states joined WCI.93
However, after delaying the enforcement of certain aspects of
the agreement to attempt to allow members to come into com-
pliance, in 2011 all of the U.S. states except for California who
were members of WCI formally left the organization.94  The WCI
now primarily consists of Canadian provinces working along-
side California to achieve emissions reductions in the region.
D. The Marginal Utility of State Legislative Action
State legislative action has been shown to be the most
effective when it grants state agencies authority to address
issues relating to climate change or when it mandates that all
or certain state agencies consider climate change mitigation,
adaptation and costs in their decision-making processes.  For
example, as mentioned earlier, New York recently passed a law
to this effect called the Community Risk and Resiliency Act,
which, among other things, requires that state funds “and per-
mits include consideration of the effects of climate risk and
extreme weather events.”95  This law empowers the state agen-
cies, particularly the Department of Environmental Conserva-
tion and the Department of State, to take significant regulatory
action on climate change.96
Certain states stand out as positive examples of how state
legislative action can be an effective method of permitting and
promoting the regulations that can ultimately have the greatest
effect on addressing climate change.  For example, California,
Oregon, and New Jersey have all used different approaches to
regulate the greenhouse gases that contribute to climate
change with varying degrees of success.97
Other states have served as examples of gridlock and ob-
structionism in ways that are similar to those employed by
Congress: opposition to international agreements regarding cli-
mate change, lack of cooperation with federal agencies, and a
general refusal to enact laws and regulations addressing cli-
93 See Western Climate Initiative, WCI Governors’ Agreement, http://
www.westernclimateinitiative.org/document-archives/general/WCI-Governors-
Agreement [https://perma.cc/9D4H-W3LH].
94 See History, WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateinitia
tive.org/history [http://perma.cc/HK9J-UKAH]; SustainableBusiness.com News,
6 States Pull Out of Western Climate Initiative, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Nov. 22,
2011, 5:29 PM), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/news.dis
play/id/23178 [http://perma.cc/2V8W-XZLV].
95 New York State Community Risk and Resiliency Act, supra note 31; see
Bagley, supra note 31; see also Piccinini, supra note 31.
96 See New York State Community Risk and Resiliency Act, supra note 31.
97 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1798–99 n.9.
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mate change causes or consequences.98  Such refusal to even
enact legislation with a broad enough grant of authority to a
state agency or agencies to work independently to create regu-
lations regarding climate change seriously restricts the regula-
tory work that agencies can accomplish.
State legislation works best to address climate change
when it enables agency regulatory action, but legislation alone
is largely ineffective as a method of instigating significant ac-
tion toward addressing climate change.
III
INSTIGATORS OF CHANGE: STATE AGENCIES AS LABORATORIES,
SOURCES OF INSPIRATION, AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTERS
A. It’s Already Working: The Effects of State Regulation of
Climate Change
States are uniquely positioned to build the foundation for
action on climate change, in part due to their primary authority
over certain key policy areas that are critical to addressing
climate change, including transportation, water, land use, en-
ergy, and economic development.99  Many states have already
begun to demonstrate the effective spread of climate change
regulation approaches among themselves, and this has strong
potential to build to a critical mass and inspire federal
action.100
Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have taken
significant action by completing Climate Action Plans, which
include estimations of the state’s greenhouse gas emissions,
summaries of probable impacts of climate change in the state,
and recommendations for climate change adaptation and miti-
gation within the state.101  As discussed in subpart I.A of this
Note, certain states, particularly California and New York,
98 See id.
99 See OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 267.
100 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1847 (“[I]t is state and local govern-
ments, not the federal government, that have taken the lead on climate change
policy initiatives.”).
101 See WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 857; Climate Action Plans, CENTER FOR
CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/policy-
maps/climate-action-plans [https://perma.cc/HSZ8-2DM7] (“The plans detail
steps that the states can take to reduce their contribution to climate change.  The
process of developing a climate action plan can identify cost-effective opportuni-
ties to reduce GHG emissions that are relevant to the state.  The individual char-
acteristics of each state’s economy, resource base, and political structure provide
different opportunities for dealing with climate change.  However, without targets
for emissions reductions, incentives for cleaner technologies, or other clear poli-
cies, climate action plans will not achieve real reductions in GHG emissions.”).
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serve as strong examples of state leadership in the field of
climate change policy.102
B. Tailored Solutions: Localized Approaches to Global
Issues
State agencies are uniquely situated in the political hierar-
chy of the United States to respond to specific state needs and
to address areas of concern at a localized level.103  In many
respects, the institutions that are the most familiar with the
local conditions and issues are best able to address the more
localized impacts and causes of climate change.104  Because
“the ecological and economic diversity of the nation requires
local knowledge and expertise that is often unavailable at the
federal level . . . [a state-level approach] is better able to over-
come this ‘knowledge problem,’ and ensure that regulatory
measures take account of local conditions.”105  Moreover,
“state and local governments tend to be more nimble and re-
ceptive to change than the federal government.”106  Because of
the more narrow focus afforded by state-level regulation, these
initiatives can “do a better job addressing local preferences and
information about sources of climate emissions and the relative
costs and benefits of mitigation strategies.  In addi-
tion, . . . state and local governments may be particularly well-
situated to develop [climate-change adaptation] measures.”107
102 See OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 267–69; WOLD ET AL., supra
note 12, at 845–49; see also Bagley, supra note 31; Piccinini, supra note 31.
103 See WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 871 (“[S]tate and local governments are
closer to those they represent, and therefore can theoretically respond quicker
and more directly to their constituents’ needs.”).
104 Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 133 (2005) (“Environmental protection efforts are most
likely to be optimal where those who bear the costs and reap the benefits of a
given policy determine how best, and even whether, to address a given environ-
mental concern.”).
105 Id. at 137 (citation omitted).
106 David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our
“Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmen-
tal Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 356 (1994); see Paulette L. Stenzel, Right to
Act: Advancing the Common Interests of Labor and Environmentalists, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 1, 3-4 (1993) (“The process of starting on the state or local level seems to
work well politically, because the public seems more willing to accept new ap-
proaches on a local or state level rather than at the national level.  Individual
states can choose varying mechanisms as the tools for achieving their goals.
Then, those laws can be examined to see which options have proven to be the
most effective.”).
107 Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of Climate
Federalism, 17. TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 433, 450 (2008).
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Ecological considerations also favor a state-level approach,
because the vast variations in environmental conditions, is-
sues, and needs among states do not lend themselves to more
uniform, broad, or generalized federal regulation.108  A federal
“one size fits all” approach to regulation cannot possibly antici-
pate or accommodate the actual environmental conditions and
issues involved in every ecosystem in the country.109  Because
climate change is an inherently multiscalar issue that “is the
result of actions taken by actors at all scales and . . . will have
effects at all scales,” an approach that has its basis in state-
level regulation would simply be laying the foundation for ac-
tion at other levels, both broader and more localized.110
In addition, the rulemaking process that state agencies
undergo when developing new regulations affords the opportu-
nity for public input at a more local level.  Rulemaking can be a
valuable opportunity for state citizens and interest groups to
actively contribute to and shape the state agencies approach to
developing regulations on climate change.  Moreover, although
rulemaking can be a long and tedious process at the state or
the federal level, the state rulemaking process is likely to out-
pace the rate of progress occurring at the federal level consider-
ing the intense polarization of the political parties at the
national level and the ongoing gridlock.
Although some scholars have argued that allowing the
states to develop their own approaches to climate change
would facilitate a “race to the bottom,” where each state com-
peted to lower its environmental regulatory standards in order
to attract the most business, this concern has proven to be
largely unfounded in practice.111  While the federal government
stalled for years and failed to take any significant action on
climate change, many states have ploughed resolutely ahead
with implementing significant environmental and climate-
change regulations, despite the fact that some states have cho-
sen not to and might therefore be seen as having some form of a
competitive advantage in attracting business.112  The states
108 See Adler, supra note 104, at 135 (“Because most environmental problems
are local or regional in nature, there is a strong case that most (though not all)
environmental problems should be addressed at the state and local level.”).
109 See id. at 136 (“Ecological systems vary tremendously from one place to the
next.  The failure to take into account local environmental conditions—let alone
local tastes, preferences, and economic conditions—leads to ‘one size fits all’
policies that fit few areas well, if at all.”).
110 OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 264.
111 See Adler, supra note 104, at 151.
112 See id. at 156.
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that have taken significant regulatory action appear to have
recognized that climate change regulations alone will not deter
most businesses from choosing to conduct business in a state
that has other redeeming economic qualities.113  In addition,
the Clean Power Plan’s requirements that almost all states re-
duce emissions and develop state-wide plans may even the
playing field and prevent some states from developing a com-
parative business advantage.
C. Political Considerations: Avoiding Gridlock and
Inspiring Action
State agencies face a lower level of public scrutiny and are
typically held less politically accountable than federal agencies
or politicians at the state or federal level.  Although interested
members of the public and many interest groups pay close
attention to agency-level action, politicians at the state level
often seem to prefer to direct agencies to act rather than acting
themselves through legislation.  Delegating to the agencies dis-
tances the politicians from the political repercussions of the
action at issue and insulates the details of the action, in most
cases, from broad public scrutiny.
Additionally, state agencies by their nature tend to be more
insulated from, and independent of, the political process.  State
agency officials do not run for office or have specific constituen-
cies, other than the state as a whole, to consider in their deci-
sion-making processes. Moreover, a large percentage of most
agencies’ staff have technical backgrounds and are experts in
their fields, which often means that they are more likely to
consider what would be the best approach to address issues
with greater objectivity and without as much regard to political
considerations.  While the state governor usually appoints
agency heads and has significant influence over the direction
that agencies take, agencies do have a certain level of insula-
tion from state politics and can make some of the determina-
tions regarding which regulations are necessary and how
certain policies or laws should be implemented.  This uniquely
positions state agencies to take action on climate-change adap-
tation and mitigation.
Despite agencies’ relative insulation from the political pro-
cess, governors and state legislators are easily able to call at-
tention to positive regulatory developments and outcomes
when public knowledge of certain regulation would provide po-
113 See id. at 156–57.
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litical benefits.114  In many states, particularly those that have
already taken measures to address climate change, there is
strong public support—and therefore significant political in-
centives—for state regulation of the causes and effects of cli-
mate change.115  Many governors have already benefitted from
the positive public attention based on “their proactive stances
on climate change.”116
Particularly if the country were to suffer a crisis related to
climate change or if some other event spurred a sudden shift in
opinion towards a willingness to address climate change at the
national level,117 these state regulatory programs could serve
as guidance and as examples to the federal government of what
approaches have already proven successful.  The federal gov-
ernment often draws its inspiration from state laws, regula-
tions, and policies that have proven to be effective or that have
garnered broad public support.  By starting to address climate
change at the state level, the states will be able to influence the
federal government’s approach to climate change legislation
and regulation.118  States have taken a variety of approaches in
an effort to compel or inspire federal action on climate change:
through litigation, such as Massachusetts v. EPA119 and Ameri-
can Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut;120 through voluntary par-
ticipation in emissions reductions independently or through
regional initiatives; and through developing areas of state econ-
omies relating to energy efficiency and renewable energy.121
States’ actions have the potential to attract media attention
and could increase public awareness of the issues related to
climate change on the local and global levels.122  Additionally,
114 See OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 263.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1841 (“Numerous scholars have
acknowledged the importance of . . . dramatic events [such as Love Canal; the
Bhopal, India tragedy; and the Exxon Valdez oil spill] in prompting congressional
action on [federal environmental] statutes.”).
118 See id. at 1847 (“[S]tate and local initiatives can play an instrumental role
in generating innovative policies and propelling change at higher levels of
government.”).
119 See generally 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (finding that greenhouse gases fall
within the Clean Air Act’s definition of “air pollutant” and that therefore the
Environmental Protection Agency had the statutory authority to regulate green-
house gas emissions).
120 See generally 564 U.S. 410, 411 (2011) (determining that a federal common
law nuisance claim against power companies based on the companies’ carbon
dioxide emissions contributing to climate change was displaced by the Clean Air
Act and Environmental Protection Agency action.)
121 See OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 263.
122 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at 1847.
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the success of state-level action could increase public support
and awareness for climate-change mitigation and adaptation
efforts, resulting in greater public pressure on the federal gov-
ernment to take significant action toward addressing climate
change, on the national and international levels.123
Although smaller in scale than national approaches, local
and state-level mitigation and adaptation efforts impact the
progression of climate change and the public’s ability to re-
spond to climate-change related crises when they occur.124
Despite the fact that states in many ways will not experience
the full benefits themselves of regulating greenhouse gas emis-
sions, in most cases states have the potential to experience
certain benefits such as reduced energy costs, decreased traffic
congestion, improved air quality, decreases in respiratory ill-
nesses such as asthma, and reductions in waste.125
Moreover, states are best positioned to act as the “laborato-
ries of democracy” because states are already taking different
approaches to responding to climate change, and the results of
various state policies and regulations can be compared and
analyzed to determine which approaches are most effective in
different circumstances.126  State regulatory initiatives can
function as “innovation centers”127 and “as useful experiments
on the efficacy of various climate policy measures.”128  This
kind of experimental policy environment allows the states not
only to develop possible solutions for federal-level regulation,
but also to “compete” amongst each other to develop the most
123 See id. at 1844–45.
124 See OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 263; see WOLD ET AL., supra
note 12, at 871.
125 See OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 263.
126 See WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 871 (“[S]tates have traditionally acted as
laboratories for new policies and thereby allowed the federal government to adopt
its own policies based on the failures and successes of state innovations.”); Adel-
man & Engel, supra note 1, at 1847–48; Markell, supra note 106, at 358 (“As
Justice Brandeis pointed out in his famous dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann in 1932, ‘it is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”).
127 Markell, supra note 106, at 355 (“The emergence of state governments as
central actors in the environmental arena should not be unexpected.  It also
should not be unwelcome.  Concerning the former, the existence of fifty state
governments, as well as many more local governments, within our federal system
inherently creates both numerous ‘innovation centers’ and the opportunity to try
a wide variety of approaches simultaneously or within short periods of time.”).
128 See OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 264 (quoting Jonathan Adler,
Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of Climate Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 433, 450 (2008)).
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effective and efficient regulatory programs.129  The lessons
learned from state efforts in this area can then be applied by
any kind of jurisdiction, from the village or city level to the
national or international level.130  These lessons have the bene-
fit of being “reality-tested” and “are more likely to have been
refined and made workable” than many of the policies, laws, or
regulations enacted at the federal level.131
States acting as laboratories can also inspire federal legis-
lation or regulation for the pragmatic reason that the federal
government or certain affected industries may prefer to work
with one consolidated and uniform regulatory system rather
than adjust state-by-state to the different rules and
regulations.132
Overall, states appear to be ideally placed in the U.S. politi-
cal hierarchy to begin to effectively address climate change as
centers of innovation; as more localized actors familiar with the
political needs and economic and environmental realities
within their borders; and as political actors that, although cer-
tainly affected by partisan politics, are slightly more insulated
from the extreme polarization that currently exists between the
political parties at the federal level.
CONCLUSION
Although it may initially appear counterintuitive to advo-
cate approaching a global issue from a more local starting
point, the political will requisite to achieving broader national
or international policies, laws, or solutions to the issues of
129 See Adler, supra note 104, at 137 (“[D]ecentralization, and the resulting
policy experimentation and interjurisdictional competition, can encourage policy
innovation as policymakers seek to meet the economic, environmental, and other
demands of their constituents.  As a result of such competition, states are able to
learn from each others’ successes and failures.  This competition allows states to
act as environmental ‘laboratories’ developing new and improved ways of address-
ing environmental concerns.”).
130 See WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 871 (“[B]ecause states have acted before
the federal government, they have gained expertise as regulators in areas that the
federal government has yet to regulate.”); Adelman & Engel, supra note 1, at
1847–48; Markell, supra note 106, at 410 (“As the federal government seeks to
learn how best to reinvent itself . . . it will benefit enormously from carefully
studying the experiments in environmental regulation that New York and other
states have conducted and in which they are currently engaged.”).
131 Markell, supra note 106, at 356–58 (“Because the damage resulting from
innovations ‘gone awry’ is less significant, or at least more localized, if the innova-
tions occur at the state level rather than at the federal level, the federal govern-
ment should welcome and indeed actively encourage state innovations.”).
132 See WOLD ET AL., supra note 12, at 871 (“[V]arying state policies create an
uneven regulatory environment, which is difficult and costly to navigate.”); Adel-
man & Engel, supra note 1, at 1848.
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climate change is simply not yet existent in the United States or
within the international community.  Because of the ongoing
polarization and reticence of the political actors on both the
national and international levels, the best approach to address-
ing climate change in the United States is to start with state
regulatory action.
By serving as the test laboratories and centers of innova-
tion for the federal government and by demonstrating to fed-
eral-level politicians that there is political will and economic
justification behind local-level climate-change regulatory ac-
tions, state agencies are best positioned to incite larger-scale
government action on climate change.133  Additionally, state
agencies are equipped with the expertise and information nec-
essary to develop regulations that are specific to the individual
state’s climate-change adaptation and mitigation needs and
strengths.134  Although federal government action is critical to
large-scale efforts to address climate change and plays a signif-
icant role in international agreements, state-level regulatory
action is the ideal approach in the current political environ-
ment to build a strong foundation of U.S. action on climate
change from which the other levels of government can build.
Ultimately, if there is any real “solution” to the complex
and multifaceted problem of climate change, it is one that will
arise out of action taken at all levels of governance.135  Instead
of succumbing to inaction and passively waiting until a global
or national approach to addressing climate change is devel-
oped, states have the opportunity to start now to play a role in
limiting the sources of climate change, preparing for its effects,
and putting pressure on actors at all other levels to join them in
taking action.136  Until concerted action on the part of the fed-
eral government or the international community is a political
possibility, state-level regulatory action provides the best hope
of and inspiration for effective U.S. governmental action toward
mitigating and adapting to climate change.
133 Markell, supra note 106, at 358.
134 See Adler, supra note 104, at 137.
135 See OSOFSKY & MCALLISTER, supra note 10, at 266 (“We need to recognize
that doing nothing until a global treaty is negotiated maximizes the risk involved
for everyone.  Rather than only a global effort, it would be better to self-con-
sciously adopt a polycentric approach to the problem of climate change in order to
gain benefits at multiple scales as well as to encourage experimentation and
learning from diverse policies adopted at multiple scales.”).
136 See id.
